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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: Appellant does not dispute the filing date of his application 
for unemployment benefits, nor does he dispute the original IDOL determination. The IDOL 
does not dispute that the original determination of timeliness of the filing of the appeal from this 
first determination was proper, 1 so Appellant will not discuss this further. 
As IDOL now concedes, the first determination was vacated and the appeal dismissed, so 
that a new determination could be made with the correct figures (IDOL Respondent's Brief, p. 
1). This point was a factor addressed in Appellant's original brief. 
After the new Determination was made on August 12, 2015, Appellant appealed from 
that determination and a second hearing was held on September 16, 2015. Judge Richmond 
heard the case to its conclusion and ruled that Appellant had "wilfully misrepresented his weekly 
earnings" and was thereby ineligible for unemployment benefits. The determination also ordered 
reimbursement of the overpayment. Appellant filed his appeal to the Commission. 
The Commission reviewed the record de nova, including Appellant's brief in support of 
his appeal to the Commission. There was no other evidence requested or submitted. 
IDOL and Appellant are not in dispute as to the procedural record or the course of 
proceedings. They are in dispute as to the facts that were found, and the effect of the 
"substantial, competent evidence" test. 
1 Appellant had moved and did not receive the first determination in a timely manner; this 
was discussed in the first appeal hearing and resolved in Appellant's favor. 
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PRESENTED AND ARGUMENT: 
same: 
IDOL POSITION 
Christy's testimony about an 
IDOL employee, "John," 
advising him to report his net 
earnings is not supported by 
notes of the IDOL. 
"During his second appeal, 
Christy asserted for the first 
time that he has problems 
with numbers and doesn't 
read well." 
APPELLANT POSITION 
In Christy's July 28, 2015, 
testimony, he testified that he 
went to the Department's 
"Water Tower Office" in 
Meridian concerning the 
reporting of his income 
during the unemployment 
period. He testified that he 
was told to "report what he 
got" as discussed with Ms. 
Roop in the second hearing, 
Tr 9.16.15, p. 15, L. 13-24. 
The mistake is twofold, and 
the IDOL simply refuses to 
recognize the distinction. 
"Report what he got" could 
mean EITHER "gross" OR 
"net." The IDOL 
representative and Mr. 
Christy clearly could have 
understood the term 
differently. 
The exhibits-the 
department's own 
records-show that Mr. 
Christy is and was confused 
by several things in the 
instructions. 
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FURTHER COMMENTS 
The IDOL notes do not 
discuss this topic, nor do they 
have a place to do so. Please 
consider the exhibits attached 
to the Notice of Telephone 
Hearing of 9/3/2015, which 
are the written exhibits. The 
"Notes" begin on Exhibit 
page 27 of 85 and run 
through page 39 of 85. There 
is no question ever asked, nor 
any place to make such a note 
by the IDOL representative. 
In fact, those are the 
Claimant's weekly reports. 
Also look at the notes on p. 
40 Of 85 for 12/19/14 and 
1/2/15. A review of those 
notes show that Appellant 
was confused about what he 
was to report and whether he 
understood the questions 
properly. 
Christy should not be 
penalized for bringing this up 
on his "second" appeal. The 
first appeal was dismissed 
and never completed. 
Moreover, his testimony at 
the first appeal was never 
completed.. Judge Richmond 
terminated that hearing and 
dismissed the appeal so that 
Ms. Roop could review the 
new information and 
IDOL POSITION 
"The Commission did not 
find Christy's explanation for 
his enors to be credible." 
"The Commission observed 
that Christy was apprised on 
multiple occasions during the 
unemployment benefits 
application process that he 
was to report his gross 
earnings" specifically 
including a Power Point 
presentation. 
APPELLANT POSITION 
In all candor, the 
Commission, in its de nova 
review, never made that 
statement expressly or 
impliedly. Rather, the 
Commission's review 
centered on the written 
instructions and the internet 
based system for the weekly 
repo1t. The Commission 
asserted that "the issue in this 
FURTHER COMMENTS 
documentation and make a 
new determination, from 
which a NEW appeal would 
be taken. 
The Commission asserted 
that "the issue in this case 
comes down to assessing the 
probability that, given the 
information available to 
Claimant, he did not know 
what IDOL was asking, 
and, then, deliberately 
elected not to seek 
clarification. Meyer, 99 
Idaho at 762, 589 P.2d at 
case comes down to assessing 97." 
the probability that, given the 
information available to 
Claimant, he did not know 
what IDOL was asking, and, 
then, deliberately elected not 
to seek clarification. Meyer, 
99 Idaho at 762, 589 P .2d at 
97." 
The PowerPoint presentation 
simply is not all there. This 
is a substantial issue to 
Appellant. There is a great 
amount of emphasis in the 
decisions of all concerned 
about the slide show but a 
great deal of it is missing. 
And with a de novo review, 
there is no place for 
Appellant to object to 
consideration of the 
incompetent hearsay 
evidence. 
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This "PowerPoint" 
presentation starts on Exhibit 
page 12 of 85 and continues 
to page 14. Nowhere on this 
PowerPoint presentation does 
the phrase "gross earnings" or 
any synonym therefore 
appear at all. Rather, it was 
asserted that there was a 
drop-down menu to this 
effect, but that was never 
cured between the exhibits 
from the first to second 
appeal, or at any time 
thereafter. The Commission, 
apparently, relied on 
evidence that was not 
IDOL POSITION 
"Claimant also received a 
booklet ... This booklet 
includes a section describing 
how earnings affect a 
claimant's weekly benefits. 
The provision included the 
statement that a claimant 
'must report all amounts 
earned, even if gross earnings 
are less than half the 
claimant's weekly benefits 
payment." 
"To illustrate how Christy's 
claimed excuse failed to 
explain the discrepancies for 
most of the reporting weeks, . 
. . " the IDOL sets forth yet 
another table, similar to that 
in the Commission's 
Decision and Order. 
"The Commission, in what 
arguably was a factual and 
legal stretch, gave Christy the 
benefit of the doubt with 
regard to three reporting 
weeks." 
APPELLANT POSITION 
Again, this mentions 'gross 
earnings' in an entirely 
different context. The 
booklet does not say that the 
applicant is to report his 
gross earnings at all; it makes 
one comment about gross 
earnings but does not say that 
it is gross, rather than net, 
earnings that are to be 
reported. 
The Commission's table is 
used to support its findings 
that the "excuse" would only 
apply for January 3, January 
24, February 7. Yet neither 
the Respondent's Brief nor 
the Commission's Decision 
and Order explain the 
breakpoint they used to 
determine that the "excuse" is 
or is not applicable. This is 
not discretionary; this table is 
as arbitrary as the 
Commission's decision. 
As stated in the prior topic, 
why those three? Just as 
valid an argument can be 
made that the 'substantial, 
competent evidence,' without 
being arbitrary, would only 
support finding against 
Christy for 2/28, 3/14 and 
3/21. Those dates are where 
the variance would exceed 
$40. 
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FURTHER COMMENTS 
anywhere the 
The highlighted portions are 
those that the Commission 
allowed but it is impossible 
to see what standard they 
used. January 2, for example, 
is 5 cents difference; the next 
week is $4.56. January 23 is 
25 cents and February 6 is 15 
cents. February 20, though, 
is only $4.36 difference and 
January 16 $16.53. What is 
the standard for this 
"discretion?" There is NO 
standard that can be deduced 
from either table. 
IDOL POSITION 
creates another 
straw man argument when 
he lambasts testimony 
concerning a "pop-up" in the 
slide presentation about 
gross earnings that he would 
have viewed, and the fact 
that there was no 
documentary evidence of 
the actual slide or image of 
the pop-up admitted to 
support the testimony. What 
Christy fails to mention, 
though, are the other slides, 
the booklet and the 
confirmation page 
that all were admitted 
without objection, which all 
apprised Christy of his duty 
to report his gross wages --
that is, his earnings before 
deductions." 
"Christy also has no answer 
to the reasoning of 
Commission's decision and, 
in particular, the questions it 
raised concerning his 
credibility, other than, 
perhaps, the weak and 
essentially unsubstantiated 
claim that he suffers from 
mental infirmities relating to 
his math skills and English 
comprehension." 
APPELLANT POSITION 
This is far from a 'straw 
argument The phrase is 
defined as "a weak or 
imaginary argument or 
opponent that is set up to be 
easily defeated." Me1Tiam-
Webster's Dictionary. That 
phrase, however, is 
misleading. The point is that 
the "popup" was on the 
claimant- employee's weekly 
report-that online form 
which Appellant filled out 
every week as required. We 
don't know what it said 
because it does not exist in 
this record. The significance 
of that popup was that it was 
relied on by the Department 
in both of the appeals 
hearings. 
The Commission's de novo 
review was supposedly based 
on the existing record. If it 
had these so-called 
"questions," then why did the 
Commission not perform its 
obligations under its own 
Rules of requesting further 
evidence or testimony on this 
point? 
FURTHER COMMENTS 
The failure to have that 
popup in the record was 
addressed in the first appeals 
hearing of 7.28.15, p. 21, l. 
14-24; p. 23, 1. 12-18. The 
Department, in these 
hearings, put great weight on 
this popup as reminding 
Appellant weekly that he was 
to report gross earnings. Yet 
it is conspicuously absent. 
Moreover, that absence was 
not co1Tected in the hearing 
of 9.16.15, where it was 
discussed at p. 22, 1. 12-25-p. 
23, 1. 1-10. There was no 
way to examine that popup, 
or cross-examine based on its 
wording, or even ask 
Appellant about his 
understanding of it because it 
doesn't exist. 
The Commission clearly 
went into this appeal with the 
predilection to make sure that 
the Appellant would not 
prevail. This is discussed 
more fully in the next topic 
below. 
One major issue, not addressed by the IDOL, is the violation by the Commission of its 
own procedural regulations and the statutory framework governing "de novo" review of the 
record. 
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Commission, its Decision 
Idaho Super Grade v. Idaho Dept Of Commerce and 
='-"-"-' 144 Idaho 386 (2007) for its authority to conduct a de nova review. However, these 
authorities do not quite go as far as the Commission believes. 
Idaho Code §72-1368(7) reads as follows (emphasis added): 
(7) The commission shall decide all claims for review filed by any interested party in 
accordance with its own rules of procedure not in conflict herewith. The record before the 
commission shall consist of the record of proceedings before the appeals examiner, unless 
it appears to the commission that the interests of justice require that the interested parties 
be pe1mitted to present additional evidence. In that event, the commission may, in its sole 
discretion, conduct a hearing or may remand the matter back to the appeals examiner for 
an additional hearing and decision. On the basis of the record of proceedings before the 
appeals examiner as well as additional evidence, if allowed, the commission shall affirm, 
reverse, modify, set aside or revise the decision of the appeals examiner or may refer the 
matter back to the appeals examiner for further proceedings. 
In the Brief of Appellant dated 10.26.15 to the Commission from the decision of the Examiner, 
the Appellant cited the Commission's own Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure (RAPP), 
pursuant to the above statute. As stated, there was no request for a further evidentiary hearing 
because the briefs were to "be based upon the evidence as established in the evidentiary record. 
Any inclusion of, or comment on, evidence not contained in the record as admitted by the 
Appeals Examiner will not be considered by the Commission." Yet the Commission did exactly 
that. 
Amazingly, at least to Appellant, the term "de novo" is not contained anywhere in the 
RAPP. Rather, the rules state specifically that the review would be based on the existing record 
unless the Commission, in its discretion, either allowed for a new hearing, a limited hearing on 
some specific points or issues, or remanded to the examiner. This is in the 'discretion' of the 
Commission. 
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presentation additional evidence. 
was no such request here, and no notice that it was doing anything else than an appellate review 
of the existing record. The Commission did grant Appellant the right to file a brief, which 
Appellant did. 
This Court has had recent occasion to construe 'abuse of discretion' when applied to the 
Commission. See Boyd-Davis v. Macomber Law, 342 P.3d 661 (Idaho, 2015), holding that there 
is a "three-part test is used when reviewing whether the Commission abused its discretion. 
Flowers v. Shenango Screenprinting, Inc., 150 Idaho 295,297,246 P.3d 668,670 (2010). This 
Court determines: " (1) whether the Commission co1Tectly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, (2) whether it acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (3) whether it reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Id. ( quoting Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Commerce & 
Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390, 162 P.3d 765, 769 (2007)). 
Rather than the Super Grade decision, however, which was not a case involving 
unemployment compensation, Appellant request this Court compare two similar decisions 
involving unemployment benefits with disparate results and the teachings therefrom: Small v. 
Jacklin Seed Co., 109 Idaho 541, and Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1. Both were unemployment 
cases where the applicant resigned due to alleged sexual harassment. Small resulted in a remand 
to the Commission, while Jensen was affirmed. The reasons for the distinction were outlined in 
the Jensen decision, where this Court stated that "In Small v. Jacklin Seed, 109 Idaho 541, 709 
P.2d 114 (1985), the underlying claim was sexual harassment, however the sole issue presented 
was whether the findings of the Industrial Commission were supported by substantial evidence. 
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at 
v.t\.Luv,w were not contained the record. The Court then 
that the question Jensen was the applicable standard, and the Court held that the 
definition of "sexual harassment" was not a term of which Idaho had ever defined; therefore, in 
looking at the "various guidelines, standards and cases defining sexual harassment," the Court 
could not conclude that the Commission e1Ted as a matter of law in its findings. 
In this case, however, the Commission did not properly exercise its discretion. It gave 
Appellant credit for weeks and failed to do so for other weeks based on what appears to be no 
standards whatever. It did not request, as it had discretion to do, additional evidence on the 
Appellant's language and mathematical difficulties. Rather, they "wilfully" disregarded the 
uncontradicted testimony because it was not presented at the first hearing-even though that 
hearing was terminated by the Hearing Officer. 
The uncontradicted evidence, which was simply disparaged by the Commission due to 
the timing of the testimony, is that Appellant has dyslexia in numbers and letters (Tr., 9.16.15, p. 
34, 1. 21-25). He has reading difficulties and always has (p. 35, L. 1-12). And he is not a native 
English user; rather, Tagalog (native Filipino) is his native language (p. 35, 1. 19-25). The 
Commission did not have the discretion to ignore that testimony under Idaho law; if they had 
questions or wanted to examine him over that point, then their discretion should have called for a 
hearing on that point as required by Idaho Code §72-1368(7). 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
The IDOL requests that attorneys' fees and costs be awarded to the Department. The 
IDOL states that attorneys' fees on appeal are all that are awardable. At this juncture, Appellant 
has not requested attorneys' fees for the hearings before the Appeals Examiner or the 
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matters. it 
was not 
not said prior to this appeal 
in the 
the State acted "without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." This was a disputed matter on both sides. 
Rather, the IDOL claims that this appeal "does nothing more than ask this Court to 
reweigh the evidence." That position ignores the issues presented. Appellant asserts that the 
Commission violated several well-defined precepts of law, its own rules in the RAPP, and failed 
to properly exercise its discretion in various manners discussed above. This appeal is not 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law; rather, the Commission's ruling is itself clearly 
eIToneous and cannot stand. Attorneys' fees for this appeal are appropriate. 
Dated this 141h day of October, 2016. 
LAW OFFICE OF D. BLAIR CLARK, PC 
Page 9 of 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of October, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and con-ect copy of the within and foregoing, to the following: 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRAIG G. BLEDSOE- ISB# 3431 
CHERYL GEORGE - ISB# 4213 
DOUGLAS A. WERTH - ISB# 3660 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
FAX: (208) 334-6125 
And to: 
GRASMICK PRODUCE 
215 EAST 52ND ST 
BOISE ID 83714 
CONSOLIDATED ELECTRICAL 
1920 WESTRIDGE DR 
IRVING TX 75038 
MR MUDD CONCRETE CORPORATION 
119 E 46TH ST STE 206 
GARDEN CITY ID 83714 
IDAHO STATE PENITENTIARY 
STATEHOUSE 
BOISE ID 83720-0001 
Page 10 of 10 
